The Rentier State and Institutional Decay in Nigeria: A Political Economy Analysis

Abstract

Nigeria’s persistent institutional challenges raise important questions about the relationship between natural resource wealth, political power and public accountability. Despite substantial petroleum earnings over several decades, the country continues to experience weaknesses in public service delivery, revenue mobilisation, institutional oversight and the implementation of development policies. This article examines the relationship between rentier-state dynamics and institutional decay in Nigeria, focusing on the period 2015–2025. It adopts a qualitative documentary research design, drawing on recent academic studies, government reports and publications by international institutions. Rentier State Theory provides the principal analytical framework for explaining how dependence on petroleum revenues can weaken the relationship between taxation and political accountability, encourage elite competition for state-controlled resources and reinforce patronage-based political relationships. The analysis argues that resource dependence alone does not inevitably produce institutional decline; rather, its consequences depend on the rules governing revenue allocation, public expenditure, political competition and institutional oversight. Nigeria’s experience demonstrates how weak revenue mobilisation, discretionary resource distribution and persistent accountability challenges can undermine institutional effectiveness and inclusive development. The article recommends stronger domestic revenue mobilisation, transparent petroleum revenue management, independent oversight, performance-based public expenditure and reforms that strengthen citizens’ participation in governance.